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Europe’s Vaccine Paradox: From 
Supply to Demand Issues
The collective action on vaccine procurement has attracted much criticism, but not necessarily 
for the right reasons. It successfully protected the internal market and EU values from vaccine 
nationalism. BioNTech became a European success story, and EU vaccine deliveries and vaccina-
tion are gaining speed. Yet, the demand side to vaccines brings the role of the European sectoral 
regulator to the forefront.
Public health is one of those policy areas in which competences remained almost exclusively with 
EU member states. With the exception of common safety concerns, including protection of the in-
ternal market, EU actions in public health are supportive in nature (as is the case of the EU’s health 
strategy that complements member states’ national health services and medical care).
The EU vaccine strategy was set up as a joint action at the EU level, agreed upon by the Com-
mission and the member states, when uncoordinated member state responses to the COVID-19 
crisis had repeatedly put common goods (public health, but also the internal market and Schen-
gen) and European values (solidarity) at risk. The Commission took over the vaccine procurement 
initiative for the entire EU to prevent wasteful competition for scarce vaccines between member 
states and protect smaller ones from being charged higher prices or even losing out. A group of 
member states (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) had started to negotiate supplies 
of large quantities of a given vaccine (Oxford-AstraZeneca) just for themselves in the summer of 
2020. Joint procurement would protect the internal market (and with it European integration) from 
potentially disruptive effects of member states fending for themselves and make use of the bloc’s 
bargaining power for the benefi t of all member states in an industry characterised by a limited 
number of large suppliers and worldwide competition for vaccines.
The fact that the European Commission negotiated vaccines for the member states, drawing on its 
expertise in trade negotiations, resulted in very competitive prices internationally (as an acciden-
tally leaked price list well illustrates). That said, the European Commission has admitted to short-
comings stemming from a lack of negotiation experience with the specifi c sector (pharmaceutical 
industry), which led it to initially underestimate supply issues and the need for production capacity 
building; those issues were subsequently addressed.
The EU’s vaccine portfolio represents the possible common denominator. It refl ects that member 
states harbour different preferences for national suppliers and production, the type of vaccines, 
prices, etc. (which explains why BioNTech-Pfi zer’s initial offer to supply very large quantities of its 
novel messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) vaccine was scaled down) and constraints (fi nancial). 
The Commission entered advance purchase agreements with a set of six potential suppliers and 
two different types of vaccines (vector-based and mRNA) with the consent of all member states. 
Member states were entitled to buy a specifi ed number of vaccine doses in a given time period 
and at given prices for their domestic vaccination campaigns and were free to decide not to make 
use of their pro-rata share (proportional to their population compared to the EU’s).
Regrettably, this built-in fl exibility has not prevented countries that have opted to buy less than 
their share of available vaccines to rather unethically and opportunistically blame the Commission 
for their own choices when AstraZeneca failed to honour its delivery commitments and to accuse 
other member states of failing them on solidarity grounds. The EU, a rules-based organisation and 
staunch defender of multilateralism, stayed true to its values. It did not succumb to European vac-
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cine nationalism even in a situation of relative vaccine scarcity, standing out as a major exporter of 
vaccines and contributor to COVAX.
Since the second quarter of 2021, EU vaccine deliveries and vaccination have been gaining speed 
thanks in part to increasing production capacity in the EU and anticipated additional deliveries 
from BioNTech-Pfi zer. Another 1.8 billion doses of its vaccine have been secured for 2022-23.
While the collaborative action seems on track with regard to supply side issues, a demand issue 
arose. Vaccines are a pharmaceutical good, requiring regulatory approval. This takes time but is 
necessary to ensure public trust, which is essential. As vaccination is voluntary, safety and effi ca-
cy is key for the acceptance and uptake of the vaccine and the success of vaccination campaigns. 
The vaccines that were contracted and granted European Medicines Agency (EMA) approval not 
only have different cost-effectiveness properties but also vary in their effi cacy against the original 
virus and against mutants, in the ease in updating it and, not least, in side effects.
In short, they are not a homogeneous product, which leaves the EU in a paradoxical situation. The 
mRNA vaccine by BioNTech-Pfi zer is a European success story and at the basis of the successful 
early vaccination campaigns in the US and in Israel (and also the start of the UK campaign). Yet, 
those countries took risks that the EU, with a comparatively vaccine-cautious population, arguably 
could not. It is doubtful that Europeans would have been prepared to go along with emergency 
approvals and testing vaccines fi rst, even less so vaccines with a novel approach untested on a 
large scale. It was after having witnessed the high effi cacy and milder side effects that Europeans 
warmed to mRNA vaccines.
The rollout of mRNA (BioNTech-Pfi zer and Moderna) and vector-based vaccines (AstraZeneca, 
later also Johnson & Johnson) introduced “competition in the market” in the EU. Consumers/citi-
zens will make a rational choice between available vaccines, from an individual (not societal) per-
spective on the basis of what they consider trustworthy information. The choice before them was 
between mRNA vaccines, increasingly established as the vaccine “gold standard”, and AstraZen-
eca’s vaccine, beset by problems from the beginning (data issues, delivery failures, serious col-
lateral effects). After insisting on nevertheless going ahead with the AstraZeneca vaccine, most EU 
countries have subsequently suspended its use (below a certain age, or even for all age groups) in 
light of rare but serious side effects.
The handling of the AstraZeneca case by the European regulator was hardly liable to build trust. 
EMA, which had granted AstraZeneca’s vaccine conditional approval (which the US health author-
ities have not to date), did not pause it to analyse reported cases of blood clots, unlike many other 
national regulators (and the American Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Food and 
Drug Administration in the case of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine). Instead, EMA’s insistence that 
the vaccine was safe and that the benefi t-risk profi le was positive echoed that of the British Medi-
cine and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, although the latter eventually recommended 
age group limitations. EU national health authorities stepped in to analyse causality, risks, etc., and 
ended up deciding nationally on restrictions to the use of the vaccine.
The Commission has drawn the logical conclusion: It did not prolong the contract with AstraZen-
eca and will go with ‘proven reliable’ suppliers with EU production capacity in the future. In the 
meantime, while the US will give away mostly vector-based vaccines, in the EU politicians and 
some health authorities insist that vaccines that happen to be in stock are good enough to get 
faster (possibly illusionary) herd immunity. Yet that may erode the trust of citizens concerned that 
societal benefi ts may come at an individual cost. At the end of the day, defeating COVID-19 calls 
for a strategic and longer-term approach on vaccines – a high level of protection, also against new 
variants, an ease of adaptation combined with reliable supplies – but requires a high uptake, which 
rests on maintaining citizens’ trust in European institutions. Citizens should thus not be denied the 
right to choose when there is a portfolio of vaccines.
